
Doping did not invent cheating in sport. It took cheats who were already there and made them faster, stronger and far harder to catch. Artificial intelligence is about to do the same thing for hybrid warfare. It will not invent a new kind of attack. It will take the cheap, deniable, low-grade sabotage that unfriendly states already run against their rivals and put it on steroids.
Two stories from the past fortnight show the before picture. Keep them in mind, because the after picture is worse.
Exhibit one: the bomb hoaxes
Across Europe this autumn, a wave of fake bomb threats has hit schools, airports and airlines. Italy alone saw threats sent to hundreds of schools in a single stretch, forcing evacuations, panic and the kind of disruption that ripples through every parent’s working day. Earlier in the year dozens of airlines were targeted. The threats are almost always empty. That is not the point. The point is the cost: every one has to be taken seriously, every evacuation burns police hours, and every family is rattled.
Right now this still takes a person to write and send the threats. The open question that should keep security services awake is what happens when it does not. An AI agent can draft, translate, personalise and dispatch thousands of convincing threats across a dozen countries and languages in an afternoon, for almost nothing. Nobody has proven that is what sits behind the current wave. Nobody can rule it out either, and the sheer volume is exactly the signature you would expect once the work is automated.
Exhibit two: the freezers
At the same time, attackers have been reaching into the refrigeration systems of European supermarkets, pushing freezers towards fifty degrees in hundreds of French stores and hitting shops across Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Estonia in early November. The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre has said plainly that these attacks did not need AI. The systems are old and badly secured. But the same agency warns that AI will make this kind of attack on critical infrastructure far easier, and expects it to be a realistic threat by 2028.
Spoiled ice cream is trivial. The template is not. The same weakness runs through hospital cold storage, water treatment and logistics. A human can poke one system at a time. An agent can poke all of them at once.
The doping analogy, in full
Here is why performance-enhancing drug is the right phrase and not lazy hype. A banned drug does three things: it raises output, it lowers the skill needed to compete, and it is built to be hard to detect. AI used for sabotage does all three. It raises output, with one operator running thousands of simultaneous attacks. It lowers the barrier, so you no longer need a skilled team, you need a prompt and a budget. And it muddies attribution, because automated, multilingual, machine-paced activity looks like background noise rather than a single hand.
That combination is a gift to any state that wants to grind down a rival without firing a shot. Hybrid warfare has always been about cheap, deniable pressure on civilians: disinformation, cyber-nuisance, sabotage you can shrug off at a press conference. AI makes every part of that cheaper and more deniable at the same time.
So what do we do about it
Two things, and neither is comfortable. First, defenders have to assume volume. Security built for a handful of human attackers falls over when the attacker is a tireless machine running around the clock, so the only real answer is more automation on the defensive side, which is its own arms race. Second, governments have to treat nuisance attacks as the reconnaissance they are. A fake bomb threat and a melted freezer are not isolated pranks. They are probes, mapping how a society reacts, how fast, and where it is soft.
What this means
We keep filing these stories under weird news. A country’s schools emptied by an email nobody can trace. A supermarket’s freezers cooked from a laptop abroad. Taken one at a time they look like pranks and petty crime. Lined up, they look like a dress rehearsal for a kind of conflict that never gets formally declared, run by tools that get cheaper and better every month. The drug is already in the system. The testing has not caught up.
Edgar Friendly, calling the AI bullsh*t. More tools, more swearing: toptoolstack.com.
Did you know? The term hybrid warfare went mainstream in Western defence circles after 2014. The tactics are far older. The only thing that has really changed is the price, and AI is about to cut it again.